+(,121/,1(
Citation:
Eric J. Maier, Schrodinger's Cell: Pretrial Detention,
Supervised Release, and Uncertainty, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1425 (2017)
Provided by:
The University of Chicago D'Angelo Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Jan 2 12:19:29 2018
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
your smartphone or tablet device

Schr6dinger's Cell: Pretrial Detention,
Supervised Release, and Uncertainty
Eric J. Maiert
INTRODUCTION

As quantum theory developed, Erwin Schr6dinger began to
explore the strange results the theory seemed to predict. Oversimplifying, quantum theory proposed that a single atom could
be in two places at once but that observing the atom at one point
would cause it to exist at only that point.' The atom, prior to
observation, both existed and did not exist at a particular point.2
In a thought experiment meant to highlight the absurdity of
such a result, Schr6dinger asked his colleagues to imagine two
closed boxes, each of which holds a single atom that is exhibiting
this strange behavior. Other than the atom, one box is empty;
inside the other is a cat and a Geiger counter that, upon measuring the presence of an atom, would pull the cork from a bottle of
cyanide, spilling the poison and killing the cat. Schr6dinger suggested that quantum theory's prediction meant that it was possible to create a scenario in which the cat was simultaneously
dead and alive.3 Absurd as this seems, a nearly two-decade-old
federal circuit split places federal defendants in an equal state of
indeterminacy.
The passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
19844 created the indeterminacy that this Comment addresses.
This omnibus bill marked a major shift in how the federal judiciary dealt with criminal defendants in nearly every phase of the
criminal justice process. Most notably, the Act fundamentally
altered both the federal bail system and federal sentencing. At
bail hearings, federal judges were now empowered not only to
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impose conditions that would assure a criminal defendant's appearance at trial, but also to consider the risk a defendant might
pose to the community if released.5 The Act also emphasized the
need for certainty in sentencing by replacing discretionary federal parole boards with judge-ordered supervised release
terms-set periods of time following prison terms during which
a defendant is allowed to live in the community but required to
adhere to certain conditions.6 Although the aims of both the sentencing and bail reforms are relatively clear, the interaction of
the two systems has created substantial uncertainty among the
circuit courts. In particular, the federal circuits are divided as to
whether pretrial detention can toll a supervised release term.
18 USC § 3624(e), which governs the tolling of supervised
release terms, states that such terms "do[ J not run [that is, are
tolled] during any period in which the person is imprisoned in
connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime
unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."7 The question is whether, when a defendant is ulti-

mately convicted, the credit he receives to his prison term for
any time spent in pretrial detention creates the necessary "connection." If it does, it tolls a supervised release term, delaying
the expiration of the term for an amount of time equal to the
time the defendant spends in pretrial custody.
Consider the following example. Defendant X is convicted by
Judge A of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to
a term of imprisonment to be followed by a two-year supervised
release term. Sixty days prior to the expiration of his supervised
release term, he is arrested and charged with larceny. Unable to
secure pretrial release, he is detained while awaiting trial for a
total of seventy days. Ultimately, he is convicted of larceny and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. If his supervised release
term was tolled while in pretrial detention, he will still need to
serve sixty days of that term when he is released after serving
his prison term for larceny. If it wasn't tolled, it expired prior to
his larceny conviction, and he is no longer under court supervision for his possession conviction.

5

See Comprehensive Crime Control Act § 203, 98 Stat at 1976-80, 18 USC
(e)-(f).
Comprehensive Crime Control Act § 212, 98 Stat at 1999-2000, 18 USC § 3583.
18 USC § 3624(e) (emphasis added).

§ 3142(c),
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Defining the exact contours of a supervised release term has
important consequences for criminal defendants. Federal law
requires that every supervised release term carry the condition
that the defendant refrain from committing another crime.8 Violation of this or any other condition of supervised release may
result in revocation of the term and the imposition, in its stead,
of a prison term equal to "all or part of the term of supervised
release authorized by statute .

.

. without credit for time previ-

ously served."9 If a defendant had been serving a two-year supervised release term, then revocation-no matter when during
that term it occurs-could result in a two-year prison sentence.
What's more, the federal sentencing guidelines advise judges
that prison terms imposed upon revocation "shall be ordered to
be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that
the defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from the conduct that is the basis
of the revocation of probation or supervised release."10 The power
to revoke lies with the court that imposed the sentence, but it
remains with that court only so long as the supervised release
term is running.11 While the term runs, the court also has the
power to extend the length of the term and may modify any of
its conditions.12 The most important limit on the scope of a
court's near-plenary power in this area, then, is temporal. Determining whether pretrial detention tolls supervised release thus
determines when a defendant is released from the power of the
sentencing court.13
Consider again Defendant X from above. As a reminder, sixty
days before the expiration of his two-year supervised release
term imposed by Judge A for possession, X was arrested and

18 USC § 3583(d).
18 USC § 3583(e)(3).
10 USSG § 7B1.3(f). While the Sentencing Guidelines no longer carry the force of
law after the 2005 case United States v Booker, 543 US 220, 245 (2005), it appears this is
an oft-followed policy. See, for example, United States v Jaimes-Benitez, 644 Fed Appx
299, 300 (5th Cir 2016); United States v Smith, 571 Fed Appx 938, 939-40 (11th Cir 2014);
United States v Day, 2012 WL 6019113, *4 & n 1 (WD Ark).
11 See 18 USC § 3583(e)(3).
12 18 USC § 3583(e)(2).
13 The statutes governing probation contain an identical tolling provision. See 18
USC § 3564(b). Because no court has analyzed this question as it relates to probation,
this Comment focuses on supervised release. Nevertheless, the analysis is identical in
both scenarios, and the dual purpose to which this statutory language is put only heightens
the importance of finding a resolution.
8
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charged with larceny.14 At his bail hearing, Judge B places him
in pretrial detention, in which he remains for seventy days. At
his larceny trial, X is convicted and sentenced to another year in
prison. Because in almost all jurisdictions there is a statutory
requirement that prison sentences receive credit for any time
spent in pretrial detention,15 his new prison sentence will be
credited with the seventy days he spent in jail awaiting trial.
After learning of this new conviction, Judge A initiates revocation proceedings on the theory that X violated the conditions of
his supervised release. X objects and claims that his supervised
release expired as scheduled. Judge A disagrees. He believes
that when X received a credit to his sentence for his pretrial
detention, that detention became "connected" with his conviction
and thus tolled his supervised release term. If X is correct,
Judge A has no jurisdiction, and thus no power to impose any
additional punishment. If Judge A is correct, however, he may
revoke X's supervised release term and require that X serve up
to two additional years in prison. Although this hypothetical
seems as though it would arise only infrequently in the real
world, a Bureau of Justice Statistics study of recidivism rates
among the supervised release population suggests otherwise.
That study found that within a year, nearly 20 percent of offenders under supervision were arrested for a new crime.16 Within five years, 43 percent of the' sample population was arrested
on suspicion of a new crime.17 Clearly, a substantial number of
the inmates awaiting trial in jails around the country may
simultaneously be serving supervised release terms.
Since 1999, six separate circuits have considered this question. While each circuit proclaims the statutory language provides an unambiguous answer, no consensus has developed.
Four circuits believe, like Judge A above, that the "connection
with a conviction" requisite to toll supervised release exists
14 According to the terms of § 3624(e), it does not matter whether this crime is federal, state, or local.
15 If the second crime is a federal crime, the sentence credit would be required by 18
USC § 3585(b) ("A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of
imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention ... as a result of the offense
for which the sentence was imposed."). Almost every state has a similar required credit.
See Arthur W. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 9:28 at 444-45 & nn 2-3 (West 3d ed 2004).
16 See Joshua A. Markman, et al, Recidivism of Offenders Placed on Federal Community Supervision in 2005: Patternsfrom 2005 to 2010 *3 (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
June 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/46KA-JYYB.
17
See id.
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when a defendant receives a sentence credit for time spent in
pretrial detention, thereby connecting tl'e conviction and the
period of pretrial detention.18 In these circuits, defendants who
are serving supervised release terms while they sit in pretrial
detention are in Schr6dinger's cell. As they await the disposition
of their second trial, they cannot know whether their pretrial
detention will ultimately be connected to a possible conviction,
tolling supervised release. Until they receive judicial "observation" in the form of a verdict, they remain both under and not
under court supervision. Two other circuits have held that
pretrial detention is incapable of ever tolling supervised release.
One circuit contends that the statute unambiguously requires
tolling only for periods of detention that follow convictions.19 The
other circuit reasons that the statute unambiguously precludes
the kind of backward-looking analysis in which the majority
position engages.20 Their reasoning, however, offers insufficient
rebuttal to the majority position.
This Comment resolves the confusion by focusing on the
purposes of the statutes in question. A proper resolution of this
issue demands an understanding of not only the tolling provision, but also the other statutes with which it interacts. Part I of
this Comment investigates the text and the legislative history of
each of those statutes. Part II canvasses the cases that have confronted this question and analyzes the various positions of the
circuits. Finally, Part III proposes a purpose-driven resolution to
the interpretive problem the tolling provision has posed for
courts. Contrary to every court to have considered the issue, this
Comment accepts that the statutory text is ambiguous at best.
Thorough analysis of the legislative history, combined with
consideration of the quasi-constitutional ramifications of the
majority position, indicates that pretrial detention should not
toll supervised release.
18 See Part I.C. See also United States v Goins, 516 F3d 416, 422-23 (6th Cir
2008); United States v Molina-Gazca, 571 F3d 470, 473-74 (5th Cir 2009); United States
v Johnson, 581 F3d 1310, 1311-12 (11th 2009); United States v Ide, 624 F3d 666, 669-70
(4th Cir 2010).
19 See Part I.B. See also United States v Morales-Alejo, 193 F3d 1102, 1105 (9th
Cir 1999) ("A plain reading of [the tolling provision] suggests that there must be an imprisonment resulting from or otherwise triggered by a criminal conviction.").
20 See Part I.D. See also United States v Marsh, 829 F3d 705, 709 (DC Cir 2016)
(reasoning that the statute's use of the present-tense expression "is imprisoned in
connection with a conviction" renders it inapplicable to pretrial detention preceding a
conviction).
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I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

The tolling of supervised release is controlled by a single
statutory provision, 18 USC § 3624(e), but the current controversy also concerns several other statutes. Namely, this issue
implicates federal bail statutes and 18 USC § 3585, which credits
the sentences of convicted defendants for time spent in pretrial
detention.21 Each of these statutes was created or amended by
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, passed at the end
of "a decade long bipartisan effort . . . to make major comprehen-

sive improvements to the Federal criminal laws."22 The drafters
of this omnibus legislation claimed it would "restore a proper
balance between the forces of law and the forces of lawlessness."23 Understanding two of the Act's component chapters-the
Sentencing Reform Act of 198424 and the Bail Reform Act of
198425-is vital to determining whether Congress intended pretrial detention to toll supervised release terms.
Part L.A examines the Bail Reform Act and the history of
bail reform. It discusses the legislative history and logistics of
pretrial detention, noting the judicial reaction to these reforms.
Part I.B analyzes the Sentencing Reform Act. In particular, it
examines one of the Act's major innovations-supervised release.
It also reviews the legislative history of one of the Sentencing
Reform Act's minor facets-the sentence-credit provision. Although that provision is perhaps an unassuming piece of the
overall project of these Acts, it has become the lynchpin for the
majority of circuits that have considered the central question of
this Comment.
A.

The Bail Reform Act of 1984

Bail and pretrial detention are deeply rooted in Anglo-Saxon
history and have been a part of American criminal procedure
since before the beginning of the republic.26 In this Comment,
the term "bail" refers to the conditions attached to the pretrial

§§

21

See 18 USC

22

Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess

3142, 3585.

1 (1983), reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 3182, 3184.

23 Id at 2 (quotation marks omitted).

Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987.
Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1976, codified in various sections of Title 18.
26 See June Carbone, Seeing through the Emperor'sNew Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic
Principlesin the Administrationof Bail, 34 Syracuse L Rev 517, 519-21, 529-32 (1983).
24
25
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release of a defendant. From its Anglo-Saxon origins on, the
most common condition was financial. The presiding magistrate
would determine an amount (based on the severity of the alleged
crime) for which the defendant was required to secure a personal
surety who would be responsible for payment should the defendant flee.27 This practice was seen as a way to balance the need to
ensure a defendant's appearance at trial with the desire to limit
pretrial detention.28
The colonists brought this tradition with them to North
America, where defendants would have "a friend or neighbor
take a pledge, backed by property, and assume responsibility for
[them] until trial."29 Although the Framers were certainly familiar with the practice of bail,30 they neglected to explicitly guarantee a right to bail in the Constitution. Instead, the nation's
charter provides only that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required."31 It is difficult to say with any certainty, then, whether
the Framers believed bail was a necessary practice.32 Despite the
Constitution's implied approval of bail, the Supreme Court has
consistently affirmed that bail is essential to the fundamental
presumption of innocence in American criminal procedure.33
These declarations notwithstanding, American judges have always retained the power to deny bail and detain defendants as

27 See id at 520-21. As initially conceived, the amount required of the surety was
equal to the fine that would be imposed if the defendant were convicted. Id. The surety
was responsible for paying that fine in full if conviction in fact resulted. Id.
28 See id (describing the Anglo-Saxon bail system as "perfectly designed"). See also
Betsy Kushlan Wanger, Note, Limiting Preventive Detention through ConditionalRelease:
The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982 Pretrial Services Act, 97 Yale L J 320, 323 n 19
(1987) (explaining that, in medieval England, pretrial detention without bail could be
extremely prolonged because magistrates traveled from county to county and, consequently, were only in particular towns for a few months every year).
29 Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: PretrialDetention, Punishment,
& the Sixth Amendment, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev 1297, 1324 (2012).
30 Several colonial charters, in fact, included a guaranteed right to bail. Id at 1325.
31
US Const Amend VIII.
32 There is some debate as to whether the omission of a right to bail was deliberate
or a "historical accident." See Appleman, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1326 & n 145 (cited in
note 29).
33 See, for example, Stack v Boyle, 342 US 1, 4 (1951) ("Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of
struggle, would lose its meaning.").
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they await trial, though they typically did so only when the defendant was charged with a capital offense.34
Over time, ordinary citizens became more reluctant to act as
sureties for criminal defendants, giving rise to the "commercial
bondsman system."35 Because "[t]he pecuniary commitment of a
commercial bail bondsman did not necessarily reflect the defendant's own stake in appearing at trial," the breakdown of the
personal surety system led to the imposition of "financial conditions of release that exceeded [] defendant[] ability to pay."36 In
effect, the dawn of the commercial bondsman ushered in the
commonplace use of financial conditions as "sub rosa pretrial
detention."37

In response to this development, Congress enacted the Bail
Reform Act of 1966,38 which attempted to emphasize pretrial
supervision as a way to secure the release of defendants without
the requirement of excessive financial conditions.39 The reliance
on financial conditions in the federal system continued to wane
until the Bail Reform Act of 1984 finally prohibited sub rosa pretrial detention by declaring that judicial officers "may not impose a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention"
of the defendant.40 The 1984 Act, however, did more than prohibit excessive financial conditions. It fundamentally altered the
purposes to which judges were permitted to put pretrial detention. It allowed judges to consider not only the risk that a defendant might flee to avoid trial, but also the risk the defendant
posed to the members of the community into which he would be
released.

34 See John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionalityof PretrialDetention,
55 Va L Rev 1223, 1225-27 (1969) (noting a "pervasive practice of denial of bail in capital
cases when the eighth amendment was ratified in 1791").
35 Appleman, 69 Wash & Lee L Rev at 1329 (cited in note 29).
36 Wanger, Note, 97 Yale L J at 324 (cited in note 28).
37 Id.
38 Pub L No 89-465, 80 Stat 214, codified in various sections of Title 18.
39 See Wanger, Note, 97 Yale L J at 325 (cited in note 28).
40 18 USC § 3142(c)(2). This is not the case, however, in the many states in which
onerous financial conditions may still lead to pretrial detention. See, for example, Gabriel
Loupe, Comment, The Lack of Money Is the Root of All Evil: Louisiana's Ban on Bail
without Surety, 77 La L Rev 109, 114, 138-39 (2016) (concluding that a Louisiana law
banning recognizance bonds for arrestees charged with certain drug offenses "allows for
a situation in which the indigent may languish in jail while their peers, identical to them
in all regards save wealth, are freed pending trial").
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1. The history of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.
Prior to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the Court limited bail
to a single purpose, namely, "assuring the presence of [the] defendant" at trial.41 In fact, "[b]ail set at a figure higher than an
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose [was] 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment."42 In 1984, Congress felt the
purpose of bail needed expansion. At least one representative of
Congress believed that "over half of those out on bail [were]
committing crimes" and that the bail system must account for
this danger.43 The 1984 Act required judges to consider not only
what conditions would assure a defendant's appearance at trial
but also the safety of the community into which the defendant
might be released.44 This marked a major shift from the Bail
Reform Act of 1966, the legislative history of which clearly indicates a belief that deciding to detain a defendant because of
"predicted-but as yet unconsummated-offenses" was "extralegal."45 Some members of Congress were cognizant of this re-

markable change, noting that the 1984 Act marked "a significant departure from the basic philosophy of the Bail Reform Act
[of 1966], which is that the sole purpose of bail laws must be to
assure the appearance of the defendant at judicial proceedings."46 But many in Congress advocated for the change on the

grounds it would "address the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release."47
United States v Salerno48 upheld the constitutionality of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984's requirement that judges consider
community safety when setting bail and when authorizing pretrial
detention.49 In that case, the Court stated that "when Congress

Stack, 342 US at 5.
Id.
43 Anti-Crime Act of 1984, HR 5690, 98th Cong, 2d Sess, in 130 Cong Rec 28595
(Oct 2, 1984) (statement of Rep Sawyer).
44 See S Rep No 98-225 at 3 (cited in note 22) (describing assuring both community
safety and defendants' appearances at trial as purposes of the legislation).
45 Federal Bail Procedures, Hearings on S 1357 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1965) ("1965 Bail Hearings")
(statement of Sen Ervin).
46 S Rep No 98-225 at 3 (cited in note 22).
41

42

47

Id.

481 US 739 (1987).
Id at 745 ("We think that respondents have failed to shoulder their heavy burden
to demonstrate that the Act is 'facially' unconstitutional.").
48

49
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has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest
other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth
Amendment does not require release on bail."50 In holding thus,
however, the Court was careful to note that "[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is
the carefully limited exception."51 Prior to Salerno, the Court
had held that "under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may
not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt."2 In order to

reconcile this precedent with its finding that the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 was constitutionally permissible, the Court held that
Congress's intent was "not [to] formulate the pretrial detention
provisions as punishment for dangerous individuals."5s Accordingly, pretrial detention, even when ordered for predicted "but
as yet unconsummated" crimes, can never be penal.54
2. Logistics of bail and pretrial detention.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 set up an intricate statutory
scheme to guide judges in determining whether a defendant
should be detained or released pretrial. When a defendant is
charged with a federal crime, the district court must determine
if or how that defendant should be monitored pending trial.55
The court may release a defendant on his personal recognizance

Id at 754-55.
Id at 755. Whether pretrial detention has remained, or ever was, the "carefully
limited exception" to which the Salerno majority referred is debatable. In fiscal years
2008 through 2010, for instance, only 36 percent of defendants appearing before federal
district courts were released prior to trial. Thomas H. Cohen, PretrialRelease and Misconduct in Federal District Courts, 2008-2010 *1 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Nov
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/9ZFP-2L7Y.
52 Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520, 535 (1979). See also Ingraham v Wright, 430 US 651,
674 (1976) (noting that detainees' liberty interests are protected by the Due Process
Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment); Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144,
186 (1963) (identifying, "dating back to the Magna Carta," a "cherished tradition" that
"punishment cannot be imposed without due process of law") (quotation marks omitted);
Stack, 342 US at 4 ("The traditional right to freedom before conviction ... serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to conviction."); Wong Wing v United States, 163
US 228, 237 (1896) (requiring a trial to establish guilt before alien detainees could be
subjected to hard labor); Hudson v Parker, 156 US 277, 285 (1895) ("The statutes of the
United States have been framed around the theory that a person accused of crime shall
not, until he has been finally adjudged guilty in the court of last resort, be absolutely
compelled to undergo imprisonment or punishment.").
53 Salerno, 481 US at 747 (emphasis added).
54 1965 Bail Hearings, 89th Cong, 1st Sess at 3 (cited in note 45) (statement of Sen
Ervin).
55 See 18 USC § 3142(a).
50
51
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or through bail "upon execution of an unsecured appearance
bond."56 Alternatively, the court may craft conditions for a defendant's release that attempt to both "reasonably assure the
appearance of' the defendant and provide for "the safety of any
other person and the community."57 If, however, the court finds
"that no condition or combination of conditions" will suffice, it
may decide that pretrial detention is appropriate and order that
the defendant be returned to jail to await trial.58 In deciding
which of these routes to choose, a judge must consider "the nature
and circumstances of the offense charged," "the weight of the evidence against the person," the "person's character," and, importantly, whether at the time of the charge the person was "on [ ]
release pending . . . completion of sentence for an offense under
Federal, State, or local law."59 If scrupulously followed, this last

factor makes it all the more likely that those defendants charged
while serving a supervised release term will be held pretrial and
find themselves in the circumstances described in this Comment.
If a defendant is detained before trial, his time in pretrial
custody will be automatically credited to his sentence if he is ultimately convicted. 18 USC § 3585 provides that "[a] defendant
shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention" as a result
of the offense of conviction or any other charge for which the
defendant is arrested after the commission of the offense of conviction.60 The only limit on these sentence credits is that a period
of pretrial detention cannot be credited against more than one
sentence. 61 This process is discussed in greater detail in
Part I.B.3.
Because the tolling provision in 18 USC § 3624(e) provides
that federal supervised release does not run during periods of
imprisonment in connection with state or local convictions, as
well as federal convictions, this issue also implicates state and
local pretrial detention.62 The courts that have held pretrial detention tolls supervised release, however, rely on the sentence
credit to create the requisite connection. Simply put, these
18 USC § 3142(a)(1).
18 USC § 3142(f).
58 18 USC § 3142(e).
56

57

§ 3142(g)(1H3).

59

18 USC

60

18 USC § 3585(b).
18 USC § 3585(b).
18 USC § 3624(e).

61
62
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courts believe that when pretrial detention is credited to an ultimate sentence, it becomes connected with the underlying conviction and tolls supervised release terms. Therefore, although
this Comment explores the interaction of these federal statutes,
because state procedures differ with respect to crediting pretrial
custody to ultimate sentences, this issue may not arise in some
jurisdictions.6s
B. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
Congress felt federal sentencing "lack[ed] the sureness that
criminal justice must provide if it is to retain the confidence of
American society and if it is to be an effective deterrent against
crime."64 To address this, the Sentencing Reform Act fundamen-

tally reconceived how federal defendants were sentenced in two
ways. First, the Act created the US Sentencing Commission
which promulgated the then-mandatory (and now-advisory65)
sentencing guidelines that required judges to sentence defendants within strict sentencing ranges.66 Second, the Act abolished
parole and replaced it with supervised release.67 The drafters
had as their goal "a comprehensive and consistent statement of
the Federal law of sentencing, setting forth the purposes to be
served by the sentencing system and a clear statement of the
kinds and lengths of sentences available for Federal offenders."68
More specifically, the drafters hoped their reforms would "assure
that the offender, the Federal personnel charged with implementing the sentence, and the general public [were] certain
about the sentence and the reasons for

it."69

Congress hoped that supervised release would be a more
consistent and predictable substitute for parole. Parole decisions
63 In most jurisdictions, like in the federal system, a statute mandates that a sentence credit be given for any detention in relation to an offense. See Campbell, Law of
Sentencing § 9:28 at 444-45 & nn 2-3 (cited in note 15). In the "handful of states [that]
leave determination of time-served credit to the discretion of sentencing judges," it would
be necessary to determine whether the judge has actually awarded a credit for pretrial
detention before one could determine whether the controversy described here is even
implicated. Id at 444.
64 S Rep No 98-225 at 49-50 (cited in note 22).
65 See United States v Booker, 543 US 220, 245 (2005).
66 See Sentencing Reform Act § 212, 98 Stat at 1988-89, 2017-26, 18 USC
§§ 994(a), 3553(a)-(b). See also note 10.
67 See Sentencing Reform Act § 217, 98 Stat at 1999-2000, 18 USC § 3583.
68 S Rep No 98-225 at 39 (cited in note 22).
69 Id.
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were traditionally made at hearings conducted by examiners selected by the US Board of Parole.70 Although the Parole Board
attempted to inject some certainty into this decision-making
process through the creation of guidelines for the hearing examiners, those guidelines did not "completely eliminate opportunities for unstructured discretionary judgments."71 As a result,
hearing examiners often provided inmates with "spurious explanations [that] conceal[ed] . . . the true basis for the parole decision."72 The exercise of such wide discretion also meant that

neither the defendant, the court, nor the victim could know how
much of a term of imprisonment would actually be served. According to the Senate Judiciary Committee, under the new system of supervised release, "the question whether the defendant
will be supervised following his term of imprisonment is dependent on whether the judge concludes that he needs supervision."73
Congress used supervised release to do away with the
uncertainty that plagued the parole system in two ways. Supervised release is imposed by a judge at the time of initial sentencing and commences only once a defendant completes his prison
term. 74 More importantly, a supervised release term is a fixed
period of time (subject, of course, to the judge's power to modify
the term described in the Introduction).75 Taken together, these
innovations meant that, following the imposition of a sentence,
defendants, victims, and the government knew with reasonable
certainty the exact contours of the punishment.
1.

Legislative history of the supervised release tolling
provision.

Legislative history sheds little light on the supervised release
tolling provision. One possibility is that the inclusion of a tolling
provision was simply an attempt to align probation and supervised release. Probation, which also contains a tolling provision,

70 Note, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 Yale L J
810, 820, 828 (1975).
71 Id at 837.
72 Id at 839.
73 S Rep No 98-225 at 123 (cited in note 22).
74 See 18 USC § 3583(a).
75 See 18 USC § 3583(b) (listing maximum authorized terms of supervised release).
See also text accompanying note 12 (noting the judge's power to modify the term for the
duration of supervised release).
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mirrors supervised release in other important respects. 76 For instance, the conditions attached to probation are essentially identical to those attached to supervised release.77 Furthermore, the
power of the court to modify those conditions is identical to the
power of a court to modify the conditions of supervised release.78
The court's jurisdiction over and power to revoke a probation
term is, like its jurisdiction over supervised release terms, temporally limited.79 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has discussed
the purposes served by probation in much the same way that it
has discussed the purposes of supervised release.80
Initially, the supervised release tolling provision read, in
pertinent part:
The term runs concurrently with any Federal, State, or local
term of probation or supervised release or parole for another
offense to which the person is subject or becomes subject
during the term of supervised release, except that it does
not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned, other than during limited intervals as a condition of
probation or supervised release, in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime.81

In describing the provision, the Senate Judiciary Committee essentially went no further than recapitulating the terms of the
statute. 82
Two years later, the provision was amended to its current
form, which provides that "[a] term of supervised release does
not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in
connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive
days."88 The Senate Report for this amendment stated that its
See 18 USC § 3564(b).
See 18 USC § 3563(a).
See 18 USC § 3563(c).
79 See 18 USC § 3565(c).
80 Compare Roberts v United States, 320 US 264, 272 (1943) ("[T]he basic purpose
of probation [is] to provide an ... offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself without
institutional confinement."), with United States v Johnson, 529 US 53, 59 (2000) ("Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.").
81 Sentencing Reform Act § 212, 98 Stat at 2009.
82 S Rep No 98-225 at 148-49 (cited in note 22) (noting that the provision "specifies
that the term begins on the date of release and that it runs concurrently with any other
term of supervised release, probation, or parole unless the person is imprisoned other
than for a brief period as a condition of probation or supervised release").
83 18 USC § 3624(e).
76
77
78
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purpose was simply "to conform a provision concerning the running of a term of supervised release . . . with a similar provision

about probation in 18 U.S.C. [3564]."84 A more illuminating
comment was made by the House Report on the same amendment. It noted that the amendment was intended to make clear
that "a term of supervised release does not run while the person
is serving a term of imprisonment in excess of 30 days for any
offense (Federal, State, or local)."85 The House's conception of the
necessary causal relationship between an offense and the kinds
of imprisonment that toll supervised release terms is of vital
importance to this Comment's position.86
2. Logistics of supervised release terms.
Following a defendant's conviction, a district court has authority to include a supervised release term with any prison
term it chooses to impose.87 The court must consider the nature
of the offense, along with the capacity of supervised release to
deter recidivism, to incapacitate the defendant, or to rehabilitate
the defendant when deciding whether a supervised release term
is appropriate.88 Apart from determining the length of the release term, the district court also has discretion to include a
number of conditions if the court believes they are reasonably
necessary to serve the penal interests of supervised release.89 In
addition to these discretionary conditions, federal law makes
several conditions mandatory. Among those is "that the defendant not commit another Federal, State, or local crime during the
84 Minor and Technical Amendments to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, S Rep No 99-278, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 3 (1986). The actual report contains an error,
stating that the amendment was intended to bring the supervised release tolling provision into conformity "with a similar provision about probation in 18 U.S.C. 3624." Id.
Given that the amendment was to § 3624, it is clear that the report intended to reference
18 USC § 3564, which contains the probation tolling provision.
85

Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, H Rep No 99-

797, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 21 (1986) (emphasis added).
86
87

See Part III.B.
18 USC § 3583(a).

88 See 18 USC § 3583(c), citing 18 USC § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D). While the decision as to the length of a term of supervised release is statutorily in the discretion of the
court, 18 USC § 3583(b) creates upper limits for the duration terms of supervised release
based on the class of felony or misdemeanor with which the term is associated.
89 See 18 USC § 3583(d), citing 18 USC § 3563(b). Common conditions include requirements that the defendant notify a judicial officer before leaving the judicial district,
that he open his home and effects to a probation officer, and that he maintain full time
employment. See USSG § 5D1.3(c)(3), (6), (7).
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term of supervision."90 While on supervised release, the offender
is placed under the supervision of a probation officer who,
among other things, is required to "keep informed . . . as to the
conduct and condition of [the offender], who is under his supervision, and report his conduct and condition to the sentencing
court."91

The Supreme Court has unequivocally held that supervised
release commences the day the defendant is released from the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons.92 After a term begins, the sentencing court has enormous discretion over its operation. A court
may terminate the term of supervised release,93 extend the
term, 94 or "modify, reduce, or enlarge" the conditions of release.95
Most important, the court may revoke a supervised release term
and require the defendant "to serve in prison all or part of the
term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense
... without credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision."96 Accordingly, if a defendant is serving a two-year
supervised release term and violates a release condition ten
days before its expiration, the judge may revoke the term and
sentence him to serve two years in prison. Revocation proceedings are typically initiated at the direction of the sentencing
court with jurisdiction over a given term of supervised release.
When a probation officer files a report describing conduct that
may amount to a violation, the court may issue a warrant for the
defendant's arrest. 97 Revocation proceedings are governed by
Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides that upon execution of the warrant the offender should

90 18 USC § 3583(d) (requiring further that "the defendant cooperate in the collection
of a DNA sample," "that the defendant not unlawfully possess a controlled substance," and
that the defendant "submit to a drug test within 15 days of release on supervised release
and at least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter").
91 18 USC § 3603(2).
92 Johnson, 529 US at 57. See also text accompanying notes 126-27.
93 18 USC § 3583(e)(1).
94 18 USC § 3583(e)(2). The court may only impose this condition "if less than the
maximum sentence was previously imposed." 18 USC § 3583(e)(2).
95 18 USC § 3583(e)(2).
96 18 USC § 3583(e)(3).
97 See 2016 Primer on Supervised Release *11-12 (US Sentencing Commission,
June 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/323W-RZJR (listing the appropriate court responses to each grade of defendant conduct). Some courts of appeals have held that probation officers may directly file petitions seeking revocation of supervised release and
the initiation of revocation proceedings. See, for example, United States v Cofield, 233
F3d 405, 408-09 (6th Cir 2000).

2017]

Schrddinger's Cell

1441

promptly be given a hearing in front of a magistrate to determine whether probable cause exists to believe a violation occurred.98 Should the magistrate find probable cause, he then
holds a revocation hearing at which he will determine whether
revocation is warranted.99 A US Attorney will prosecute the offender, calling witnesses and presenting evidence supporting the
allegation of a supervised release violation.100 Revocation is
proper only when a court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the offender violated a release condition.101
The sentencing court typically retains authority to modify or
revoke a supervised release term from the day it commences until the day it expires. According to statute, the court may only
revoke a term of supervised release after its expiration "if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has been issued on
the basis of an allegation of [ ] a violation."102 Thus, the power of
a court over a defendant's release term is defined, in large part,
by that term's expiration date. If no warrant or summons has issued prior to that date, the court lacks any power to revoke the
term.
3. Legislative history of the sentence-credit provision.
Some courts believe that the credit a defendant receives to
his ultimate sentence for time in pretrial custody creates a connection between a defendant's pretrial detention and his conviction and thus should toll a supervised release term. 103 In the
current federal system, 18 USC § 3585(b) mandates that such
credits be applied to the sentences of convicted defendants.104 A
consideration of the history of the sentence-credit provision is
helpful to understand both its purpose and how it is best interpreted. Initially, the sentence-credit provision provided a
"credit ... for any days spent in custody prior to the imposition

FRCrP 32.1(b)(1).
99 See FRCrP 32.1(b)(2). See also 28 CFR § 2.50(a) (describing possible consequences
of a violation).
100 See United States v Burnette, 980 F Supp 1429, 1434 (MD Ala 1997) (describing a
typical hearing procedure).
101 18 USC § 3583(e)(3).
102 18 USC § 3583(i).
103 See, for example, United States v Molina-Gazca, 571 F3d 470, 473-74 (5th Cir
2009); United States v Johnson, 581 F3d 1310, 1311-12 (11th Cir 2009) (per curiam);
United States v Ide, 624 F3d 666, 669-70 (4th Cir 2010).
104 See 18 USC § 3585(b).
98
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of sentence . . . for want of bail set for the offense under which

the sentence was imposed where the statute requires the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence."105
This credit provision had two conditions that are no longer
in the statute. First, the statute provided credit only when a
person was detained because they could not afford bail. Second,
credits were available only to defendants who were convicted of
crimes that carried mandatory minimums.0 6
The primary purpose of the sentence-credit provision was
"to eliminate the disparity in sentences under certain statutes requiring mandatory terms of imprisonment."107 The 1960 Congress
that enacted this statute sought to respond to the fact that defendants who did not pay bail and whose crimes carried mandatory minimums were spending far longer in custody, pretrial or
otherwise, than their peers who were able to secure release prior
to trial.108 In other words, because mandatory minimums meant
judges could not account for time already spent in custody,
Congress hoped to provide a statutory alternative.109
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 changed the sentencecredit provision to its current form."1 The current sentencecredit provision states "[a] defendant shall be given credit toward
the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent
in official detention" as a result of the offense of which he is convicted or any other charge for which the defendant is arrested
after the commission of the offense of which he is convicted."'

The drafters did not explain why they chose to change the provision, except to point out that it provides the defendant with a
credit for time in custody for the charge on which the sentence
was ordered or "was a result of a separate charge for which he
was arrested after the commission of the current offense."112

Pub L No 86-691, 74 Stat 738 (1960).
74 Stat at 738.
107 Credit for Time in Custody Awaiting Trial, S Rep No 86-1696, 86th Cong, 2d Sess
3 (1960).
108 See id.
105
106

109 See id.
110 Sentencing Reform Act
111 18 USC § 3585(b).
112

S

§ 212,

98 Stat at 2001.

Rep No 98-225 at 129 (cited in note 22).
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Although this overview of the statutory framework may give
the impression that each covers a separate phase in a defendant's
interaction with the criminal justice system, that is not how many
criminal defendants experience them. In practice, these mechanisms-bail, pretrial detention, sentence credits, and supervised
release-overlap a great deal. For instance, the sentence-credit
provision exists only as a counterpart to the availability of pretrial
detention. As the example in the Introduction demonstrates,
when a defendant serving a supervised release term is arrested
on suspicion of a new crime, all three statutes are implicated.113
Indeed, one need not invent hypotheticals to see the frequency of
such a situation-18 percent of defendants in "federal community
supervision" (either on probation or serving a supervised release,
term) were arrested during such supervision at least once within
a year of being placed under such supervision.114 As shown below, courts have focused exclusively on the statutory text of the
supervised release tolling provision housed in 18 USC § 3624(e).
This Comment shows how a thorough understanding of this
network of statutes provides an answer to the question that has
troubled the courts.
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Courts have had little guidance from the Supreme Court in
determining whether pretrial detention can toll a supervised release term. The Court has, however, considered the supervised
release tolling provision, albeit briefly, and its comments deserve examination. Part II.A discusses what little Supreme
Court precedent exists surrounding the tolling provision. Then,
Part II.B discusses the case in which the Ninth Circuit became
the first circuit to directly confront the controversy this Comment
resolves. Part II.C analyzes the four circuit cases that subsequently rejected the Ninth Circuit's position and expressed what
has become the majority position on this issue. Finally, Part II.D
discusses the DC Circuit's recent consideration of the issue and
its rejection of the majority position.

113

See text accompanying notes 14-16.
114 Markman, et al, Recidivism of Offenders at *1, 3 (cited in note 16).
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The Supreme Court and the Supervised Release Tolling
Provision

The Supreme Court has considered the tolling provision only
once, in United States v Johnson."' Although the Court did not
consider the effect of pretrial detention on a supervised release
term, its comments surrounding the tolling provision help explain how the Court views supervised release more generally.
Roy Lee Johnson had been sentenced to 111 months in prison,
which were to be followed by a three-year term of supervised
release.116 Following a Supreme Court ruling that implicated one
of his convictions, he filed an unopposed motion to vacate, and
his sentence was reduced to fifty-one months.117 By that time,
however, he had already been incarcerated for over fifty-one
months, and thus, Johnson believed he had already begun to
serve some of his release term.118 The Government contended,
however, that no part of a supervised release term could be
served while a person is imprisoned. The Court was called on to
determine at what point a supervised release term commences. 119
The Court held that a supervised release term cannot begin
until a defendant has left the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.120
In so holding, the court made several illuminating observations.
The Court noted supervised release "fulfills rehabilitative ends,
distinct from those served by incarceration."121 Furthermore, the
Court was clear that "Congress intended supervised release to
assist individuals in their transition to community life."122 In its

attempt to support its conclusion, however, the Court seems to
have spoken rather imprecisely. Congress explicitly instructed
judges to consider the extent to which supervised release is necessary "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct" and "to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant."123 While
supervised release may be better at serving rehabilitative ends,
that is not its only purpose. The Court's remark is nonetheless
529 US 53 (2000).
Id at 54-55.
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See Johnson, 529 US at 55-56.
120 Id at 58-60.
121 Id at 59.
122 Id.
123 18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C). 18 USC § 3583(c) directs judges to consider the cited
provisions in determining the propriety of supervised release.
115
116
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understandable. Congress certainly designed supervised release
with an offender's transition to community life and rehabilitation in mind.124 The Court reasoned that "[t]he objectives .

.

. of

supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time
were to offset and ... reduce terms of supervised release."125
Although not stated explicitly, the Court suggests that when an
offender is in prison he cannot engage in the transition to community life, nor can he be rehabilitated in the way the supervised release system envisions.
Turning to the statutory text, the Court noted that, in
providing that "[t]he term of supervised release commences on
the day the person is released from imprisonment,"126 the statute
"suggests a strict temporal interpretation, not some fictitious or
constructive earlier time."127 The opinion turned on whether the
statute provided for concurrent running of a prison term and
supervised release.128 The Court held that it did not, stating that
"[t]he statute instructs that concurrency is permitted not for
prison sentences but only for" terms of probation, parole, and supervised release.129 The Court went on, stating the tolling provision "does address a prison term and does allow concurrent
counting, but only for prison terms less than 30 days in
length."130
Although the Court's opinion suggests the tolling provision
refers only to punitive prison sentences and terms, it is plausible
that this choice of language was due entirely to the question
before the Court. The Court was asked to determine whether it
was possible for a prison term to run concurrently with supervised release, and it interpreted the tolling provision as providing a negative response.
The Court's first pass at 18 USC § 3624(e) in Johnson set
the table for the current circuit split. Its two main arguments
come into conflict in the cases that more directly address the
tolling provision. On the one hand, the Court's insistence that
incarceration is inconsistent with the objectives of supervised
124 See S Rep No 98-225 at 124 (cited in note 22) (describing the transition to community life and the rehabilitation of offenders as the primary goals of supervised release).
125 Johnson, 529 US at 59.
126 18 USC § 3624(e).
127 Johnson, 529 US at 57.
128 Id at 57-58.
129 Id at 58 (emphasis added).
130 Id (emphasis added).
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release suggests a finding that pretrial detention should toll release terms. On the other hand, the Court's remark that the
statutory text requires a "strict temporal interpretation" suggests otherwise.131 Though none of the courts that have divided
over the correct interpretation of the tolling provision explicitly
rely on Johnson's reasoning, this conflict underlies the disagreement described below.
B.

The Ninth Circuit and United States v Morales-Alejo

In United States v Morales-Alejo,132 the Ninth Circuit was
the first court of appeals to consider whether pretrial detention
can toll a supervised release term. The facts model the typical
circumstances that place this issue squarely before a court. Jose
Morales-Alejo, an alien, pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the
United States. Judge James A. Redden sentenced Morales-Alejo
to a two-year prison term to be followed by a one-year supervised
release term. 133 Upon release from his imprisonment, MoralesAlejo's supervised release commenced.134 On the same day, he
was deported.135 Eight months later, Morales-Alejo was arrested
by an agent of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and was indicted on another charge of illegal reentry.136
After sitting in pretrial detention for almost four months, MoralesAlejo, just one day before his term of supervised release was set
to expire, again pled guilty and was sentenced to a prison term
to which his time in pretrial detention was credited by operation
of 18 USC § 3585.137 While Morales-Alejo awaited sentencing on
this new charge, however, Redden issued a "warrant and order
See Part II.D.
193 F3d 1102 (9th Cir 1999).
133 Id at 1103.
134 Id.
135 Id. All federal circuits to consider the question have determined that deportation
does not affect the running of a term of supervised release. See Thomas Nosewicz,
Watching Ghosts: Supervised Release of Deportable Defendants, 14 Berkeley J Crim L
105, 109 & n 53 (2009). This is sensible given that the supervised release statutes specifically state, "If an alien defendant is subject to deportation, the court may provide, as a
condition of supervised release, that he be deported and remain outside the United
States." 18 USC § 3583(d) (emphasis added).
136 Morales-Alejo, 193 F3d at 1103.
137 See id. Presumably because Morales-Alejo was not sentenced until a few weeks
later, the Ninth Circuit assumed that the plea (entered before expiration of the supervised release term) did not make his incarceration connected to a conviction. See id at
1103-06. Perhaps the district court did not accept the guilty plea until the sentencing
hearing or at least until a few days after it was entered. The court's opinion is unclear.
131

132
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to show cause regarding revocation."138 Because Morales-Alejo's
supervised release term, absent tolling, would have expired before Redden issued his warrant, Morales-Alejo moved to dismiss
the revocation proceedings, claiming that Redden lacked jurisdiction.139 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine whether the term had been tolled for any reason.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the intent of Congress is
apparent from the language of the statute" and that it had no
cause to examine the legislative history.140 The court maintained
that a plain reading of the statute "suggests that there must be
an imprisonment resulting from or otherwise triggered by a
criminal conviction" in order to toll a supervised release term. 141
This excluded pretrial detention "because a person in pretrial detention has not yet been convicted and might never be convicted."142
This interpretation, according to the court, was strengthened by its finding that Congress used the terms "imprisonment" and "detention" in very different ways. 43 While the term
"imprisonment" "is used to refer to a penalty or sentence," the
term "detention" describes "a mechanism to insure a defendant's
appearance [at trial] and the safety of the community."144 Because the statute tolls release terms only when a defendant is
"imprisoned in connection with a conviction," it was clear that
Congress did not contemplate pretrial detention.145
The prosecution in Morales-Alejo raised the argument that,
because the defendant had received a credit to his sentence by

virtue of 18 USC § 3585(b)(1), "the detention period [became]
part of the sentence."146 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the statute "gives no indication that Congress
ever contemplated the type of backward-looking analysis suggested."147 The court also noted the practical difficulties of such a

Id at 1103.
Id at 1103-04.
140 Morales-Alejo, 193 F3d at 1105.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Morales-Alejo, 193 F3d at 1105. For example, 18 USC § 3559 uses the term "imprisonment" to describe allowable punishment for various classes of crimes, while 18
USC § 3142 uses the term "detention" in the context of pretrial custody, the aim of which
is decidedly nonpenal.
145 Morales-Alejo, 193 F3d at 1105 (emphasis added), citing 18 USC § 3624(e).
146 Morales-Alejo, 193 F3d at 1105.
147 Id.
138
139
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construction. If similar facts existed, a judge would be unable to
determine whether she retained jurisdiction over a given supervised release term "in any case in which a judgment of conviction had not yet been entered."148 For those interpretive and
practical reasons, the Ninth Circuit held that pretrial detention
could not toll supervised release.149
C.

The Majority Position

Beginning in 2008, the Sixth, Fifth, Eleventh, and Fourth
Circuits each considered the question in quick succession. Each
court determined that the Ninth Circuit had erred.150
In 2008, the Sixth Circuit decided, in United States v Goins,151
that pretrial detention did toll a supervised release term when it
was credited to a defendant's ultimate sentence.1 52 That court
faced facts that mirrored, in important aspects, those present in
Morales-Alejo,153 namely a defendant who had been detained
pretrial and whose supervised release term had been revoked after it would have expired absent tolling.1 54 After being convicted
of bank fraud, Roderick Goins was sentenced to a one-month
prison term to be followed by a five-year supervised release
term. 5 ' While serving his release term, Goins was charged with
identity fraud.156 He sat in pretrial detention for sixty-three days
until he finally posted bond and promptly absconded.157 Then,
eighteen days after his supervised release would have expired
absent tolling, the relevant court issued an arrest warrant for
possible violations of supervised release.158 The question, therefore, was whether the sixty-three days Goins had spent in

Id.
149 Morales-Alejo, 193 F3d at 1106.
150 See United States v Goins, 516 F3d 416, 419-20 (6th Cii 2008); United States v
Molina-Gazca, 571 F3d 470, 473-74 (5th Cir 2009); United States v Johnson, 581 F3d
1310, 1311-12 (11th Cir 2009); United States v Ide, 624 F3d 666, 668-69 (4th Cir 2010).
151 516 F3d 416 (6th Cir 2008).
148

152 Id at 424.

153 This time, however, the court's delay was seemingly the result of institutional
bungling. The sentencing court was unaware that it possessed jurisdiction over Goins's
supervised release. Id at 417-18.
154 Id at 417-18.
155 Goins, 516 F3d at 417.

156 Id at 418.
157 Id.
158

See id.
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pretrial detention for the identity theft charges had tolled the release term. 159
The Sixth Circuit "respectfully decline[d] to adopt the Ninth
Circuit's interpretation" of § 3624(e).160 The court was required
to "apply the plain meaning of the statute if the statute [was]
not ambiguous."161 The court held that the plain meaning of the
term "imprison," according to conventional and legal dictionaries
alike, "includes not only confinements as a result of a conviction,
but [more broadly] any time the state detains an individual."162
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the Ninth Circuit's
definition of the term "imprisonment," as including only incarceration resulting from or triggered by a conviction, rendered
the statute's phrase "in connection with a conviction" superfluous.

16 3

The Goins court noted that a common canon of statutory

interpretation demands that courts "make every effort not to
interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions
of the same statute .

.

. superfluous."164

Having rebutted the Ninth Circuit's contention that imprisonment means only penal incarceration, the Sixth Circuit next
determined that the sentence-credit provision in 18 USC § 3585
created a connection between pretrial detention and a subsequent conviction.165 Accordingly, it held that pretrial detention
can toll a supervised release term. 166 Although the court conceded
that its interpretation required a backward-looking analysis, it
stated "the phrase 'imprisoned in connection with a conviction'
eschews any temporal limitations."167 Finally, the Goins court
responded to the Ninth Circuit's practical concerns. It saw no
reason that a district court attempting to determine whether it
retained jurisdiction over a supervised release term could not
simply initiate revocation proceedings and wait until the defendant was convicted to determine whether those proceedings
were valid.168 In the court's opinion, its interpretation of the

159
160

See Goins, 516 F3d at 419.
Id at 420.

161
162

Id.
Id at 422.

163

Goins, 516 F3d at 421.

164 Id (quotation marks omitted).
165

Id at 422.

166

Id at 424.
Goins, 516 F3d at 422.
Id at 424.

167
168
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statute, "despite its indeterminacy, creates only a rare and remediable problem."169
In United States v Molina-Gazca,170the Fifth Circuit agreed
with the reasoning of the Goins court.171 It adopted the Sixth
Circuit's position and buttressed that court's determination that
the distinction between Congress's use of the terms "imprisonment" and "detention" was not so clear-cut as the Morales-Alejo
court had made it seem.1 72 The court noted that 18 USC § 3041,
which describes the powers of federal judges and magistrates
"seem[ed] to reject an imprisonment-detention distinction."173
That provision states an offender "may . . be arrested and imprisoned or released ... for trial before [a] court of the United
States as by law has cognizance of the offense."174 Congress's use
of the term "imprison" to refer to pretrial detention was evidence, according to the Fifth Circuit, that Congress may have
contemplated pretrial detention when it used the same term in
the supervised release tolling provision. The Fifth Circuit, like
the Sixth, conceded that its interpretation would, in some instances, create uncertainty surrounding a defendant's supervised release, but concluded that, to the extent the language of
§ 3624(e) "results in uncertainty as to a defendant's status, our
role is not to imply [ ] limits when Congress could have done so
in the first instance."175 Following the Sixth Circuit's lead, the
Fifth Circuit observed that courts uncertain of their jurisdiction
could "wait[ ] to see if a conviction will actually occur."176
Both the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have accepted the
reasoning of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits wholesale.177 The
Fourth Circuit emphasized the fact that the supervised release
tolling provision used the phrase "during any period."178 To that
court, this phrase "necessarily includes all time periods, both before and after a conviction, for which an imprisonment is
connected with that conviction."179 The Eleventh Circuit was
169

Id.

170 571 F3d 470 (5th

Cir 2009).
Id at 473-74, citing Goins, 516 F3d at 421-22.
172 See Molina-Gazca, 571 F3d at 473-74, citing Morales-Alejo, 193 F3d at 1105.
173 Molina-Gazca, 571 F3d at 474.
174 18 USC § 3041 (emphasis added).
175 Molina-Gazca, 571 F3d at 473.
176 Id.
177 See generally Johnson, 581 F3d 1310.
178 Ide, 624 F3d at 669 (emphasis added).
179 Id.
171
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apparently so confident in the majority position that it did not
even mention Morales-Alejo and instead relied entirely on the
Fifth and Sixth Circuits' interpretation of § 3624.180
D.

The DC Circuit's Rebuke of the Majority Position

In 2016, the DC Circuit, in United States v Marsh,181 examined whether Congress included pretrial detention when it provided that supervised release is tolled "during any period in
which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction
for a Federal, State, or local crime."182 The DC Circuit joined the
Ninth Circuit in finding that pretrial detention cannot toll
supervised release.183 In concluding that defendant Brian
Marsh's pretrial detention did not toll his supervised release,
however, the court did not focus on the phrase "in connection
with a conviction."184 Instead, the opinion proclaimed that its
"conclusion rest[ed] on a word that [its] sister circuits and the
parties have appeared to ignore-the word 'is."'185
The court held that Congress's use of the present tense
"foreclosed the type of backward-looking tolling analysis" that
the majority position allowed.186 According to the DC Circuit, the
courts expounding the majority position erred in relying on the
sentence-credit provision to create the requisite connection.187
The court maintained that upon receiving a credit for time spent
in pretrial custody, "it might be appropriate to say that the person was imprisoned or has been imprisoned 'in connection with a
conviction,"' but certainly not that the defendant "is" imprisoned.188 In coming to this conclusion, the DC Circuit relied on 1
USC § 1, which provides that "[i]n determining the meaning of
any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise[,] ...
words used in the present tense include the future as well as the
present,"189 and Carr v United States,190 in which the Supreme

184

See Johnson, 581 F3d at 1311-12.
829 F3d 705 (DC Cir 2016).
Id at 707, quoting 18 USC § 3624(e).
Marsh, 829 F3d at 709-10.
See id.

185

Id.

186
187

Id at 709.
Marsh, 829 F3d at 709.

188

Id.

189

Id, quoting 1 USC

180
181
182
183

190 560 US 438 (2010).

§ 1.

1452

The University of Chicago Law Review

[84:1425

Court noted that "the present tense generally does not include
the past."191

The Marsh court also dispensed with the majority position's
concern that a contrary interpretation would render parts of
§ 3624(e) mere surplusage. The court noted that its interpretation gives effect to each of the provision's terms. 192 The phrase
"in connection with a conviction" expresses that the statute operates to toll supervised release only when a person's imprisonment is "triggered by a conviction."193 The phrase "during any
period," meanwhile, "clarifies that a term of supervised release
is tolled not only during the period of imprisonment initially
imposed upon conviction, but also any additional period of
imprisonment flowing from a conviction."194
Having addressed the interpretive concerns expressed in the
opinions adopting the majority position, the DC Circuit noted
that its interpretation also makes the most practical sense. 195
The court was critical of the majority position; the panel believed it condoned situations in which district courts would "be
unable to determine whether they retain jurisdiction over defendants."196 The court could not find "any other area of law in
which district court jurisdiction [was] similarly contingent on
future events," and was concerned that such a situation would
be unfair to defendants "who would have no idea whether they
continue[d] to be subject to court supervision."197 The requirement that a warrant or summons issue prior to the expiration of
the supervised release term, the court found, "provides fair notice
to the defendant and certainty for all."198
III. A PURPOSE-DRIVEN RESOLUTION
Substantial confusion remains as to whether pretrial detention can toll supervised release. This Comment argues that, in
order to gain clarity, it is first important to acknowledge the
ambiguity of the supervised release tolling provision. Doing so

191 Id at 448.
192
193
194

195
arising
196
197

Marsh, 829 F3d at 710.
Id.
Id.
See id (expressing concern about the jurisdictional uncertainty and notice issues
from the majority rule).
Marsh, 829 F3d at 710.
Id.

198 Id.
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suggests that courts should investigate the legislative history
surrounding not only the supervised release tolling provision,
but also the statutes with which its interaction has created such
confusion.199 Part III.A examines the deficiencies of the majority
and minority position alike, demonstrating that further analysis
is necessary to determine the proper interpretation of § 3624(e).
Part III.B shows that § 3624(e) is, in fact, ambiguous and, at the
very least, does not unambiguously carry the meaning the majority position proposes. Part III.C then examines the legislative
intent behind the creation of the statutory tolling provision. Finally, Part III.D discusses what the legislative intent behind
both pretrial detention and the sentence-credit provision tells us
about the proper conception of the supervised release tolling
provision.
A.

Schrddinger's Cell and an Insufficient Response

The circuits have divided in the two decades after the Ninth
Circuit's attempt to determine whether pretrial detention may
toll supervised release. The one thing on which all of the circuits
agree, however, is also the one thing about which they are each
mistaken-that the text of § 3624(e) is unambiguous. Because
each of these courts found the statutory text clear, their analyses went no deeper than the text of the tolling provision. Although the courts have come to opposite conclusions, each position is deficient.
1.

Schr6dinger's cell.

The majority position's acceptance of the uncertainty it creates for courts and defendants alike is troubling. First, the claim
that this problem is "rare" seems questionable, at the very least,
given that six of the federal courts of appeals have had cause to
confront the issue. The fact that over one in three defendants
sentenced to supervised release are arrested on a new charge
within three years supports this belief.200 When combined with
the length of the average term of supervised release, it is clear
that a large number of defendants will be simultaneously in
199 See Blum v Stenson, 465 US 886, 896 (1984) ("Where, as here, resolution of a
question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to
the statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is
unclear.").

200 See Markman, et al, Recidivism of Offenders at *3 (cited in note 16).
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pretrial detention and supervised release. When supervised release is required by statute, the average length is eighty-two
months, and when supervised release is added at the discretion
of the sentencing court, the average length is thirty-five
months.201
Second, and more importantly, the majority position underestimates the degree of uncertainty its result creates. It both
underestimates the cost of the jurisdictional uncertainty it
creates for courts, and it completely ignores the costs of uncertainty for criminal defendants. With respect to supervised release terms, temporal limits are also jurisdictional limits. Asking a court to commit already strained judicial resources to cases
over which its jurisdiction is uncertain is inappropriate.202 As
one commentator put it, "[u]ncertainty also leads to mistaken
jurisdictional assumptions and exercises of authority, which, if
later discovered, will undo all of the effort expended."203 At the
very least, "jurisdictional uncertainty can surely lead to both a
waste of judicial time and added expense to the litigants."204
Thus, there is certainly a "reason" that resource-conscious district
courts would not want to simply "continue the proceedings until
a conviction or an acquittal is rendered in the other case."205

The uncertainty created by the majority position weighs
even more heavily on the defendant. A defendant who has been
arrested while serving a supervised release term is placed in
Schr6dinger's cell. Just like an atom exists in both of Schr6dinger's
boxes until one lid is lifted and the atom is observed, until a defendant receives judicial observation-that is, a verdict-his supervised release both is and is not running. The sentencing court
has control over whether it will commit resources to initiate revocation proceedings despite the indeterminacy, but the defendant is entirely powerless.
201 Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release *49-52 (US Sentencing
Commission, July 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/JKT9-JNN3.
202 While the majority position does not ask courts to actually decide cases before
they are sure of their jurisdiction, it comes awfully close. Deciding cases on the basis of
"hypothetical jurisdiction" is highly disfavored and arguably impermissible. See Steel Co
v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83, 93-94 (1998) (declining to endorse "hypothetical jurisdiction" in the civil context).
203 Scott Dodson, The Complexity of JurisdictionalClarity, 97 Va L Rev 1, 3 (2011).
204 Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business between State
and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles", 78 Va L Rev
1769, 1794 (1992).
205 Goins, 516 F3d at 424.
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Uncertainty is especially severe in the shadow of a plea bargain. Plea deals essentially present a defendant with two options:
take a certain level of punishment or bet that you will receive no
punishment at the risk of receiving a substantially greater
amount of punishment. The certain punishment and the uncertain punishment, however, are not independent. The higher the
uncertain punishment is, the higher a prosecutor will be able to
set the level of certain punishment.26 When it is uncertain
whether a defendant's release term has been tolled and thus
whether he is at risk of revocation, a great amount of potential
punishment may be added to the already substantial punishment the defendant is facing for the instant offense.
Remember Defendant X from the Introduction. He is serving
a two-year supervised release term for possession. Sixty days before his release term is set to expire he is arrested for larceny
and held pretrial. Sixty-one days into his pretrial detention, the
prosecutor comes to him with a plea bargain. In exchange for
pleading guilty to the larceny charge with an understanding
that the prosecutor will recommend a mitigated sentence, the
prosecutor also promises to help reduce X's exposure to punishment for his violation of his release term.2 07
Recall that the court with jurisdiction over X's supervised
release term may or may not decide to revoke X's supervised
release.208 As noted in Part I.B.2, however, revocation can only
occur after a hearing at which a US Attorney will prosecute the
allegation of a supervised release violation. The prosecutor in
X's larceny case may therefore make X a range of offers. The larceny prosecutor may assure X that, should he agree to the larceny plea bargain, he will work with the US Attorney prosecuting his revocation hearing to recommend to the presiding
sentencing court that X be given a mitigated sentence for his

206 See Robert E. Scott and William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101
Yale L J 1909, 1947-48 (1992) ("[AIll defendants-whether guilty or innocent-are offered a sentence based upon the prosecutor's estimate of the strength of the case.").
207 Note that entering a guilty plea represents an admission on X's part that he violated the terms of his supervised release. All release terms carry the condition that the
offender must not commit a crime during the term. See 18 USC § 3583(d).
208 While the governing statute gives courts discretion in deciding whether conduct
warrants revocation (except in a few cases), see 18 USC § 3583(e), (g), the sentencing
guidelines suggest courts should treat far more conduct as subject to mandatory revocation. See USSG § 7B1.3.
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violation of supervised release.209 He may also offer to consult
with X's probation officer and ask her to refrain from reporting
the violation to the relevant sentencing court, 210 or encourage the
probation officer to offer mitigating evidence at X's revocation
hearing. The larceny prosecutor may even assure X that he will
reach out to the sentencing court that would preside over any
potential revocation proceedings and urge the judge to refrain
from revoking X's supervised release. X must decide whether
any of these offers are worth factoring in to the plea bargain he
has been offered in the larceny case.
Already faced with the difficulties of mounting a defense
while detained pretrial,211 X now must reckon with the apparent
dual state of his detention. Schr6dinger's cell places him both in
and not in danger of revocation proceedings that might result in
substantial additional incarceration. Instead of simply balancing
the likelihood that he will be convicted of larceny at trial and the
sentence he is likely to receive against the plea bargain he has
been offered, X now faces a different calculus. He must add the
likely sentence he will receive at a revocation hearing to the sentence he is likely to receive if convicted of larceny and balance
both against the bargain the prosecutor offered. Indeterminacy
with respect to the risk of revocation proceedings is undeniably a
powerful tool for securing a guilty plea in a prosecutor's alreadyfull toolbox.212 The prospect of revocation proceedings and the resulting additional prison sentence allows the prosecutor to create
209 18 USC § 3583(e)(3) gives the sentencing court wide discretion in determining
the length of imprisonment it imposes for supervised release violations. Nevertheless,
the advisory US Sentencing Guidelines provide a detailed system of sentence ranges that
depend on the grade of the supervised release violation and the criminal history of the
offender. See USSG § 7B1.4.
210 The sentencing guidelines suggest that probation officers have some discretion in
deciding what conduct they will include in their reports to the sentencing court, at least
for crimes punishable by less than a year of prison. See USSG § 7B1.2 (explaining that a
probation officer must report a violation to the court unless it is "Grade C" and the officer
determines that the violation is "minor, and not part of a continuing pattern" and "will
not present an undue risk to an individual or the public").
211

See Andrew D. Leipold, How the PretrialProcess Contributes to Wrongful Convic-

tions, 42 Am Crim L Rev 1123, 1130 (2005) (noting that "pretrial detention can hamper
the defense by making it difficult for the suspect and his lawyer to find witnesses, gather
and review evidence, and consult about strategy").
212

See Robert Schehr, The Emperor's New Clothes: Intellectual Dishonesty and the

Unconstitutionalityof Plea-Bargaining, 2 Tex A&M L Rev 385, 389 (2015) (explaining
that, especially for innocent defendants, "the process costs of proceeding to trial often
dwarf plea prices"), citing Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U Pa L Rev 1117,
1132 (2008).
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a greater downside risk to a defendant's refusal to agree to a
plea bargain. This added risk might allow the prosecutor to obtain a harsher plea bargain or to more quickly obtain a guilty
plea.
While projected trial results certainly color how defendants
understand plea bargains, other factors also weigh on the decision. For instance, "lawyers' risk aversion makes them shy away
from [] uncertainty."213 Defense attorneys who are uncertain
whether a court maintains jurisdiction over their client's supervised release term may err on the side of caution. That is, in
presenting options to their client, they may weigh the prospect
of supervised release revocation more heavily than is warranted
and give greater weight to offers from a prosecutor to work to
mitigate any potential punishment for a supervised release violation. This is important because, "[t]hough appointed counsel
may enjoy less trust, clients on average give lawyers' recommendations a great deal of weight."214
The uncertainty a defendant faces is not limited to plea bargaining. Imagine Defendant Y who, thirty days before his supervised release is set to expire, is arrested on a new charge. He sits
in pretrial detention for thirty-one days until he finally comes up
with the money to post bond. Now released, he cannot know
whether, over the next thirty days, he remains under supervision or not. Several "standard conditions" of supervised release
make this problematic.215 Should he seek permission to leave the
judicial distrit?216 Must he open his home and personal effects
to a probation officer?217 Must he maintain full time employment
or seek excusal from that requirement?218 Violation of any condition could result in revocation. The uncertainty the majority position creates places defendants in an untenable position, even
once outside Schr6dinger's cell.

213 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargainingoutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv L Rev
2464, 2528-29 (2004) (discussing factors, including uncertainty, that may affect whether
plea bargains actually reflect trial outcomes).
214 Id at 2527.
215 See USSG § 5D1.3(c) (quotation marks omitted).
216 See USSG § 5D1.3(c)(3).
217 See USSG § 5D1.3(c)(6).
218 See USSG § 5D1.3(c)(7).
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2. The Marsh court's insufficient response.
Although a succinct critique of the majority position, the
Marsh court's opinion itself is vulnerable to criticism. In holding
that 1 USC § 1 demands a forward-looking construction, it relied
on Carr, a case in which the Court considered a law that criminalized the failure of a sex offender to update his registration information if he traveled in foreign or interstate commerce. 219 The
question presented in that case was whether the law applied to
offenders who traveled prior to the act's enactment, and, provided
it did, whether the law ran afoul of the Constitution's prohibition of ex post facto laws.220 The interpretive question presented
in Marsh and its predecessors is distinguishable. The question is
not to whom does the tolling provision apply, but to what kinds
of "imprisonment." While the Court's analysis seems well-fitted
to questions of a statute's retroactivity, its use to analyze a tolling provision seems vulnerable to the criticism Justice Samuel
Alito leveled in dissent in Carr. Although it is obvious that laws
phrased in present tense do not include the past, for Alito such a
simplistic argument ignores the salient question: "At what point
in time does [the statute] speak?"221 This is especially relevant to

the analysis of a tolling provision, because an inquiry into
whether a statute or term of punishment was tolled is inherently
backward-looking. That is, a judge uses a tolling provision to
understand how a defendant's past status affects what the law
has to say about her court's present jurisdiction over a supervised
release term. Does the law speak at the point of the pretrial
detention, or does it speak at the point in time when the judge
undertakes the tolling analysis? If it is the former point in time,
the Marsh court's conclusion holds true, but not if it is the latter.
This is all to say that the use of present tense may not lend
§ 3624(e) the kind of clarity the DC Circuit claims it does. Instead of the tense of the statute, a simpler analysis focuses directly on the question whether Congress intended to include pretrial detention in the kinds of incarceration that could toll
supervised release.

219
220
221

See Carr, 560 US at 441-42.
Id.
Id at 462 (Alito dissenting).
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Statutory Ambiguity

How a court should determine whether a statute is ambiguous is, well, ambiguous.222 At least one federal judge has complained that "there is often no good or predictable way for judges
to determine whether statutory text contains 'enough' ambiguity"
3
to allow the use of legislative history as an interpretive aid.22
Some commentators have suggested that statutory ambiguity
exists on a sliding scale.224 Where exactly on that scale a statute
becomes clear as opposed to ambiguous, however, is in no way a
settled rule.225 This has led some to propose that the test for ambiguity should be whether "a lawyer would litigate the issue in
court,"226

while another has argued that the distinction between

clarity and ambiguity should be abandoned altogether and instead asks that courts simply "strive to find the best reading of
the statute."227
This Comment does not attempt to. apply a definitive test for
ambiguity. Instead, it compiles the evidence that tends to weigh
in favor of a finding of statutory ambiguity. First, the very fact
that six circuits have claimed the text is clear on its face and yet
have developed contrary interpretations intuitively belies the
notion that the statute is clear. Predictably, perhaps, there is
nevertheless a circuit split about whether a circuit split surrounding the proper interpretation of a statute is evidence of statutory
ambiguity.228 Additionally, although the majority position relies
222 See Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity: Alternative
Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 Harv J Legis 123, 125 (1992)
("The term 'statutory ambiguity' itself could have several meanings.").
223 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Review, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv L
Rev 2118, 2136 (2016).
224 See Maggs, 29 Harv J Legis at 125 (cited in note 222) (describing a spectrum that
ranges from a strict definition of ambiguity encompassing "only those portions of statutes that no court could interpret," to a loose definition that labels ambiguous "any statutory provision subject to more than one reading, even if no reasonable person would
disagree about what it actually means").
225 See Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2137 (cited in note 223).
226 Maggs, 29 Harv J Legis at 125 (cited in note 222).
227 Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2144 (cited in note 223) (advocating for a two-step interpretive process in which the first step would require judges to "determine the best reading of the text of the statute by interpreting the words of the statute, taking account of the context of the whole statute, and applying any other
appropriate semantic canons of construction" followed by a second step in which a judge
may "apply--openly and honestly-any substantive canons ... that may justify departure from the text").
228 Compare Snell Island SNF LLC v National Labor Relations Board, 568 F3d 410,
420 (2d Cir 2009) (noting a split "suggests that the statute is ambiguous"), with Allapattah
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on the lack of "an imprisonment-detention distinction" within
the US Code to buttress its finding that § 3624(e) unambiguously
points to its result,229 it seems instead to point to ambiguity. At

the very least, statutory text that is used inconsistently undermines a finding of statutory clarity.230
Another way to approach the question whether a statute is
ambiguous is to apply what is claimed to be its unambiguous
meaning. Should that application produce odd results, it is evidence that the statute lacks clarity, or, at the very least, that it
does not carry the proposed unambiguous meaning.231 The odd
ramifications of the majority position's interpretation, therefore,
point decidedly away from a finding that it is a proper interpretation. All of the courts that have considered the question discussed the uncertainty into which that interpretation places
federal district-court judges, and this Comment has demonstrated the more troubling uncertainty into which that interpretation
places criminal defendants.232
Yet another odd result further undermines the majority
position. Consider three hypothetical situations. In Situation A,
Defendant X is arrested five days prior to the expiration of his
supervised release term and is detained pretrial. After ten days
in jail, he decides to plead guilty to the new charge. He is sentenced to one year in prison, but this sentence is credited with
his ten days of pretrial detention by virtue of the mandatory
sentence-credit provision. By the majority position's logic, his
ten days in jail have now become connected with his new conviction, and yet no tolling can have occurred because § 3624(e)
states that an imprisonment cannot toll a supervised release
term if it "is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days."233 In
Services, Inc v Exxon Corp, 333 F3d 1248, 1254 n 4 (11th Cir 2003) (stating "[tlhe mere
existence of a split among circuits ... does not relieve us of our obligation to interpret
the statute independently"). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has noted that the existence of a split among authorities makes it "difficult indeed" to contend that the statutory
language prompting the split is unambiguous. Smiley v Citibank (South Dakota), NA,
517 US 735, 739 (1996).
229 See Molina-Gazca, 571 F3d at 474.
230 See United Air Regulatory Group v Environmental ProtectionAgency, 134 S Ct
2427, 2441 (2014) (stating that inconsistent use of a term within a broader statutory
scheme is "not conducive to clarity").
231 See Corley v United States, 556 US 303, 314 n 5 (2009) (explaining that odd results cut against a finding of statutory clarity). See also Barber v Thomas, 560 US 474,
491 (2010) (suggesting interpretations that produce odd results are disfavored).
232 See text accompanying notes 169-77.
233 18 USC § 3624(e).
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Situation B, Defendant X is again arrested five days prior to the
expiration of his supervised release, and is detained for ten
days. This time, however, his savvy defense attorney secures his
release pretrial, though he is, in the end, still convicted of this
new offense and sentenced to a year in prison. Again, his ten
days of pretrial detention will be credited to his sentence, but no
tolling has occurred. Finally, in Situation C, imagine either
Situation A or B and simply change the amount of time spent in
detention from ten days to thirty-one. In C, X's supervised release would be tolled because his time in detention exceeded
thirty consecutive days.
It is difficult to imagine a possible justification Congress
could have had for creating a tolling provision that encompasses
only periods of pretrial detention that last longer than thirty
days. In reporting the tolling provision, the Senate remarked
that its limitation was to ensure that "brief period[s]" of imprisonment served "as a condition of probation or supervised release" did not toll supervised release terms. 234 The absence of
tolling for those situations is sensible. After all, if brief periods
of detention result from conditions placed on supervised release
by a judge,235 he is able to account for that in determining the
length and design of the term. That is, if he chooses to punish a
violation of a minor condition of the release term with shortterm imprisonment (say fourteen days), the judge can know that
the term will not be tolled and that the overall structure of the
term will not be affected. A judge, however, is not able to foresee
pretrial detention for as-yet-uncommitted offenses,236 and therefore cannot, ex ante, design the term accordingly. Thus, the odd
ramifications the limitation would have as applied to pretrial
detention suggest that Congress did not consider it in crafting
the tolling provision.
It is possible that Congress wanted to toll the terms of those
who were deemed too dangerous to be released into the community in recognition that perhaps such a finding was evidence
that the supervised release had not fulfilled its rehabilitative
234 S Rep No 98-225 at 148-49 (cited in note 22). Note that this limitation was more
explicit in the original language of the tolling provision. See text accompanying note 82.
235 Intermittent confinement is specifically condoned by USSG § 5D1.3(e)(6) for violations of supervised release.
236 While a judge might consider the likelihood that a defendant will reoffend when
he designs the term, he has no way of predicting whether pretrial detention will result
from the new offense. See 18 USC § 3553(c).
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ends. That is, Congress may have contemplated Situation B and
decided that tolling should apply only to those detained until
trial as a good proxy for those on whom supervised release did
not have the desired effect. Situation A, however, highlights the
inadequacy of this justification. Whether a person chooses to
quickly enter a guilty plea has little to do with how effective
supervised release was in meeting its rehabilitative aims.
Another possible justification is that Congress believed periods of time less than thirty days were insignificant disruptions
to supervised release terms and should not toll such terms. This
justification seems in line with the few comments the Supreme
Court has made about supervised release, namely that it was
designed to assist defendants in their transition to community
life.237 As explained below, however, the tolling provision's insistence that imprisonment be connected with a conviction
shows that this justification is insufficient.238 Without an adequate justification, the seemingly senseless distinction between
pretrial detention that lasts less than thirty days and those that
are longer than thirty days weighs in favor of a finding of statutory ambiguity and, at the very least, suggests that the statute does
not unambiguously require the majority position's interpretation.239
Taken together, the evidence of statutory ambiguity is significant. The considerable confusion among the circuits, the interpretive errors of the Ninth and DC Circuits, the uncertainty
to which the majority position subjects judges and defendants
alike, and the several odd results of the majority position all
suggest a lack of statutory clarity. This ambiguity makes it possible to examine how the legislative history informs the proper
interpretation of § 3624(e).
C.

Legislative Intent: Supervised Release Tolling Provision

As noted above, the Supreme Court has weighed in on
Congress's intent in creating supervised release.240 In Johnson,
the Court stated that "Congress intended supervised release to

Johnson, 529 US at 59.
See Part III.D.
239 See Corley, 556 US at 314 n 5. See also Lamie v United States Trustee, 540 US
526, 536 (2004) (suggesting that when the plain meaning of a statutory text leads to
"absurd results," courts are "require[d] [ to treat the text as if it were ambiguous").
240 See Part II.A.
237
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assist individuals in their transition to community life."241 The
Court reasoned that such an intent was inconsistent with supervised release running concurrently with a prison term. The
Court's belief was that while a person is imprisoned she is not
engaging in the "transition to community life" and, therefore, allowing supervised release to run concurrently would be contrary
to the purpose of sentencing her to supervised release in the first
place.242

Of course, Congress's intent in creating supervised release
was not necessarily the same intent it had when it enacted the
tolling provision. Nevertheless, the Court's finding necessitates
a response to the obvious argument that this logic naturally extends to pretrial detention. That is, it could be said that while a
person is in pretrial detention, they are similarly incapable of
transitioning to community life.
This argument has one major weakness. If Congress intended for supervised release to run only while a defendant was
transitioning to community life, its insistence on a connection
with a conviction in order for a term to be tolled makes little
sense. Defendants held pretrial are removed from their communities regardless of their guilt or innocence. Some defendants in
pretrial detention will never be convicted, yet, while they are in
custody they too are unable to engage in the transition to community life. Nevertheless, absent a conviction on the underlying
charge, the supervised release terms of such defendants will not
be tolled. The connection between presence in the community and
the running of supervised release is tenuous at best, and it seems
unlikely that the Court's finding can fully explain Congress's intent. It thus remains important to examine the legislative history surrounding each of the statutes in question in an attempt to
divine whether Congress intended pretrial detention to toll supervised release.
It is evident from a review of the legislative history surrounding the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that the paramount
concern of legislators was to inject more certainty into the length
and contours of criminal sentencing.243 In particular, it is clear
that the creation of the supervised release term was done to allow judges to have control over who is supervised after release
241
242
243

Johnson, 529 US at 59.
See id at 60.
See S Rep No 98-225 at 49-50 (cited in note 22).
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and for how long, in contrast with the administratively regulated
parole system. 24 This was seen as preferable to a system that
based post-release supervision on good time served.245 Although
the tolling provision as enacted in 1984 could be seen as farreaching (after all, the drafters noted that supervised release
would be tolled whenever a defendant "is imprisoned other than
during limited intervals as a condition of probation or supervised release"),246 it is the 1986 amendments and the history

surrounding them that most illuminate the tolling provision as
it currently reads.
In reporting the tolling provision amendment, the House
Report stated its purpose was to make clear that "a term of supervised release does not run while the person is serving a term
of imprisonment in excess of 30 days for any offense."247 The
Sixth Circuit, the court that first developed the majority position, noted in Goins that "in connection with" is distinct from
"for," implying that the latter would indicate Congress intended
for tolling only when imprisonment resulted from or was otherwise triggered by a conviction.248 Thus, legislative history indicating that Congress believed "in connection with" was interchangeable with "for" weighs in favor of an interpretation in line
with that proposed by the Ninth and DC Circuits. This is especially true if viewed in the light of the overarching purpose of
the Sentencing Reform Act. A Congress intent on creating certainty in federal sentencing law is especially unlikely to enact a
tolling provision that results in substantial indeterminacy.249

See id at 123.
See id.
246 Sentencing Reform Act § 212, 98 Stat at 2009.
247 H Rep No 99-797 at 21 (cited in note 85) (emphasis added).
248 Goins, 516 F3d at 420-21. The Sixth Circuit first made this observation in an
unreported case. See United States v Sturdivant, 1999 WL 1204689, *2 (6th Cir). In that
case, the court observed: "It appears that Congress used 'in connection with' instead of
'for' to cover the scenario of a revocation of parole." Id at *2. In Goins the court clarified
that this opinion, though nonprecedential, should not be interpreted to imply that the
phrase "in connection with" covered only revocation of parole. See Goins, 516 F3d at 421.
249 This is not to say that Congress always perfectly carries out its stated purposes.
Rather, a clear congressional preference for certainty in sentencing, combined with legislative history suggesting an interpretation that would offer courts and defendants greater certainty in sentencing, presents a convincing argument that the more certain interpretation is in line with congressional intent. Additionally, the Court often finds
interpretations that are in line with the general purpose of a large enactment to be
favored over those that are less so. See, for example, State Farm Fire and Casualty Co v
United States, 137 S Ct 436, 444 (2016) (finding that a Senate Committee Report's
244
245
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Instead, Congress set forth a simple mechanism by which a district court can provide itself the necessary time to adjudicate
revocation proceedings. It simply asked that the defendant be
provided fair notice by means of a warrant or summons prior to
the expiration of his supervised release.250
D.

Legislative Intent: Bail Reform and the Sentence-Credit
Provision

The above discussion shows that tolling supervised release
for pretrial detention seems to lack a justification in the stated
purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. The purpose of bail reform further bolsters the argument that pretrial detention
should not toll supervised release. An accurate understanding of
pretrial detention precludes the use to which the majority position puts the sentence-credit provision. Furthermore, an examination of congressional intent in creating the sentence-credit
provision shows that the majority position results in a situation
directly contrary to that purpose.
1.

The nonpenal nature of pretrial detention.

Although Congress's clear intent to create certainty in sentencing lends credence to the view that pretrial detention should
not toll supervised release, relying on the House Report's comment that tolling occurs when a person is imprisoned "for" a
conviction remains somewhat vulnerable. It could be argued, for
instance, that the comment changes little because once the
defendant is convicted and, by operation of 18 USC § 3585, receives a sentence credit for her time in custody, that period
essentially becomes time served "for" her conviction. This argument rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of how pretrial
detention and the sentence-credit provision operate. The notion
that time served in pretrial detention could ever be "for" an offense is based on the idea that the sentencing credit retroactively
changes pretrial detention into punishment for the resulting
conviction. This interpretation of the sentence-credit provision is
sensible, especially given the initial impetus for the provision was
"to eliminate the disparity in sentences under certain statutes

"recitation of the general purpose of the statute" favored the textual interpretation offered by one party over the other).
250 See 18 USC § 3583(i).
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requiring mandatory terms of imprisonment."21 An understanding of congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent surrounding the Bail Reform Act of 1984, however, forecloses this
interpretation.
Prior to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, "the sole purpose of
bail laws [was] to assure the appearance of the defendant at
judicial proceedings."22 A major undertaking of the 1984 Act,
however, was to expand the purposes that a court must consider
in conducting pretrial proceedings. The Act added one significant
purpose-the need to consider community safety. The Supreme
Court in Salerno made clear that there is a distinction between
pretrial detention and sentences of imprisonment. Pretrial detention, the Court said, cannot be punitive.253 The Due Process
clause does not allow "a detainee [to] be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt."254
Seen in this light, it is unlikely that Congress intended, by
enacting the sentence-credit provision, to transform pretrial detention to punitive detention. Nor, according to the Salerno
Court, would that purpose have been constitutionally permissible.255 Instead, the sentence-credit provision might be seen as a
policy choice in favor of limiting incarceration. Or, perhaps, the
sentence-credit provision could be a simple recognition of the
factual (as opposed to legal) similarity between pretrial and postsentence incarceration, and an instance of government mercy.
This latter interpretation is supported by cases that have
sought to determine whether there is a constitutional guarantee
of a sentence credit for pretrial detention. As one court put it,
"[a]s a general rule, a state prisoner has no federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence absent a state
statute granting such credit."26 Some courts find an exception to
this general rule "when the pre-sentence time together with the
sentence imposed is greater than the statutory maximum penalty for the offense,"257 or more narrowly when "a criminal defendant
[] is confined before sentencing because his indigency prevents

251
252
253
254
255
256
257

S Rep No 86-1696 at 3 (cited in note 107) (emphasis added).
S Rep No 98-225 at 3 (cited in note 22).
See Salerno, 481 US at 747. See also Bell v Wolfish, 441 US
Bell, 441 US at 535.
Id.
Palmer v Dugger, 833 F2d 253, 254 (11th Cir 1987).
Faye v Gray, 541 F2d 665, 667 (7th Cir 1976).

520,

535 (1979).
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him from making bond."258 In both cases, courts have held that a

sentence credit is mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment
when a defendant is sentenced to the statutory maximum. 259 The
history of the federal sentence-credit provision,260 describing how
the provision was initially limited to mandatory sentences but
then expanded to reach any detention in relation to any offense,
is also informative. That Congress was willing to provide sentence
credits in cases beyond its constitutional mandate suggests an act
of legislative grace.
This understanding raises a more pressing concern about
the majority position. That position causes pretrial detention to
effectively lengthen punitive supervised release terms, for although supervised release has rehabilitative aims,261 it is undoubtedly a form of punishment that meaningfully constrains
defendants and places them under the power of the federal
courts. 2 2 That is to say, when a judge places a defendant who is
subject to supervised release in pretrial detention, thereby
lengthening the time that he is under the initial sentencing
court's power, that defendant's punishment is extended by the
operation of the tolling provision. This observation is enough to
raise constitutional concerns surrounding the provision. If the
majority position essentially converts periods of pretrial detention into punitive detention, that would violate the clear command that, under the Due Process clause, "a detainee may not
be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt."263 The Court has
consistently instructed lower courts to avoid interpretations that
may raise constitutional concerns when another plausible interpretation is available.24 In other words, "courts will [] not lightly
assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties."25 Given that an interpretation which does not
condone the tolling of supervised release terms for periods of
258 Palmer, 833 F2d at 254.

259 See id at 254-55; Faye, 541 F2d at 667.
260 See Part I.B.3.
261 See text accompanying notes 121-22.
262 See 18 USC § 3583(d) (providing an extensive list of both mandatory and discretionary conditions that may be placed on supervised release terms).
263 Bell, 441 US at 535.
264 See, for example, Hooper v California, 155 US 648, 657 (1895) ("The elementary
rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute
from unconstitutionality.").
265 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v FloridaGulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988).
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pretrial detention is not only available, but eminently sensible,
courts should favor its adoption.
Some commentators maintain that the Court was mistaken,
or even disingenuous, in Salerno and that pretrial detention is
indeed punitive.266 Whether you believe the Court or not matters

little for the purposes of this controversy. The government in
Salerno was emphatic that Congress did not intend to make pretrial detention punitive by enacting the Bail Reform Act of
1984.267 The government's position in Salerno essentially estops
it from taking the contrary position here in order to put pretrial
detention to use as a tolling mechanism for supervised release
terms. Because "[w]here a party assumes a certain position in a
legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he
may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed,
assume a contrary position," the government may have to choose
which conception of pretrial detention it prefers to defend.268 If it
chooses to argue for an interpretation that allows periods of pretrial detention to be converted to punitive incarceration, it might
need to argue that that pretrial detention should be an exception
from the typical preradjudication bar on punishment guaranteed
by the Due Process clause. If the constitutionality of pretrial detention on the basis of predicted danger to the community depends on the government taking the position that such detention
is nonpunitive, it may not insist on its availability while simultaneously asking courts to interpret the tolling provision in a
manner making the very same detention punitive in fact. Thus,
whatever Congress's true intentions with respect to the availability of pretrial detention to protect communities from the asyet-uncommitted crimes of defendants, Salerno forecloses the
majority position's interpretation.

266 See, for example, Leading Cases, 101 Harv L Rev 119, 175-76 (1987) (stating
that the Court's approach in Salerno "ignores the fact that detention can be both punitive and regulatory" and "silently reduced the presumption of innocence to nothing more
than an allocation of the burden of proof at trial").
267 See Reply Brief for Petitioner, United States v Salerno, Docket No 86-87, *2-5 (US
filed Jan 12, 1987) (available on Westlaw at 1987 WL 880539).
268 New Hampshire v Maine, 532 US 742, 749 (2001).

2017]

Schr6dinger'sCell

1469

2. The sentence-credit provision and unequal exposure to
punishment.
The preceding Section showed that the purpose of the sentencecredit provision is decidedly not to convert pretrial detention into
penal imprisonment. This Section focuses on what the purpose
is. When Congress first passed a sentence-credit provision, it did
so "to eliminate the disparity in sentences under certain statutes
requiring mandatory terms of imprisonment."269 The original
sentence-credit provision directly referenced the cause of the
disparity it corrected-those unable to afford bail often spent
much longer in custody than their fellow convicts who were able
to post bond. The statute has since become more capacious,
reaching not only those in pretrial detention "for want of bail,"270

but also those held pretrial for any reason. 271 Although expanded,
perhaps to serve a broader purpose, it maintains its usefulness
for correcting such disparities. Federal defendants may no longer
be held pretrial on account of burdensome financial conditions,272
but that is not the case in many states.2 73
State pretrial detention, under the majority position, is just
as capable of tolling supervised release as federal pretrial detention. The imprisonment that tolls supervised release may be
connected with any state, federal, or local conviction according to
§ 3624(e). This, however, creates a situation that runs in direct
conflict with the purpose of the sentence-credit provision. Imagine defendants X and Y, both of whom reside in a state that
allows judges to set financial conditions that result in the detention of a defendant. Both X and Y are serving federal supervised
release terms related to convictions for possession with intent to
distribute that are five days from expiration. Unfortunately, X
and Y are both arrested for larceny. Given their similarity,
Judge A sets the bail for both at $5,000. Luckily for X, his rich

S Rep No 86-1696 at 3 (cited in note 107). See also Part I.B.3.
270 74 Stat at 738.
271 See 18 USC § 3585(b).
272 See 18 USC § 3142(c)(2). This, however, does not mean that any financial condition of bail set at an amount the defendant cannot afford is prohibited. See Samuel R.
Wiseman, PretrialDetention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 Yale L J 1344, 1396
n 234 (2014) (explaining that an unaffordable financial condition is permitted "because
without the money, the risk of flight is too great"), citing United States v Jessup, 757 F2d
378, 389 (1st Cir 1985).
273 See Loupe, Comment, 77 La L Rev at 114-15, 138-39 (cited in note 40) (describing a Louisiana statute limiting recognizance bonds).
269
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uncle is able to come up with the money and he only has to
spend ten days in jail. X is ultimately convicted and sentenced,
and so receives a credit for the ten days spent in jail. No tolling
has occurred by virtue of the thirty-day requirement and his supervised release term expired as scheduled. Y, however, has no
rich uncle, and he sits in Schr6dinger's cell for forty days before
his trial commences. He is convicted, sentenced, and receives
credit for his pretrial detention. Under the majority position, his
supervised release term has been tolled, and he is now exposed
to revocation proceedings. In other words, his inability to afford
bail has exposed him to additional punishment. The sentencecredit provision has been put to a use in direct conflict with its
purpose.
The situation above provides a concrete illustration of a
broader problem with the majority position-it is inappropriate
to use the sentence-credit provision in a manner that produces
different results on account of a difference in wealth. More
broadly still, it seems in tension with a merciful congressional
purpose to use the provision to expose defendants to greater
punishment. A finding that pretrial detention cannot toll supervised release is more faithful to the purpose of the sentencecredit provision.
This odd result and the concerns expressed in the preceding
Section show the virtue of dispensing with the notion that
§ 3624(e) is unambiguous. The ability to use legislative history
to understand the entire network of statutes that gives rise to
this problem (as opposed to narrowly focusing on § 3624(e))
shows us that the sentence-credit provision, the lynchpin of the
majority position, cannot be properly interpreted as ever creating the requisite connection between pretrial detention and an
eventual conviction. Pretrial detention, the sentence-credit provision, and the prison sentences imposed for convictions each
serve a distinct purpose. Commingling these statutes without
carefully considering the purposes each serve has led the majority
of circuits to accept a troubling level of uncertainty. This Comment
has instead laid out each statute's purpose and, in doing so,
shown how allowing pretrial detention to toll supervised release
is inconsistent with legislative intent.

2017]

Schr6dinger'sCell

1471

CONCLUSION

The operation of the supervised release tolling provision
contained in 18 USC § 3624(e), and its interaction with the statutes concerning pretrial detention and the sentence-credit provision contained in 18 USC § 3585,274 has given rise to substantial
confusion among the federal circuits. No satisfactory answer has
been provided to the question whether pretrial detention can toll
supervised release. According to the majority of courts that have
considered the question, defendants held in pretrial. detention
who are serving supervised release terms may as well be sitting
in Schrbdinger's cell. As they await their trial, they are in a profound state of indeterminacy, simultaneously subject to and not
subject to the power of their sentencing courts. Only upon the
disposition of their instant cases will they gain certainty about
their status. The DC and Ninth Circuits, while coming to the
right conclusion, offer insufficient rebuttals to the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits. The fatal error in the reasoning of
all six circuits, however, is the same-each assumes that the
text of 18 USC § 3624(e) is unambiguous.
Accepting that the supervised release tolling provision is ambiguous will encourage courts to examine the legislative history
surrounding each of the relevant statutes. A thorough inquiry
into that history reveals that Congress could not have intended
for pretrial detention to toll a supervised release term. This
Comment has shown that the sentence-credit provision, on
which the majority relies to forge the requisite connection, can
never properly be viewed as creating a connection between pretrial detention and a later conviction. Instead, Congress intended
for the term of supervised release to be tolled only when a
defendant is serving a prison term resulting from or otherwise
triggered by a conviction.
Hundreds of thousands of citizens are currently serving
supervised release terms.2 75 When they are arrested on new
charges and held in pretrial detention, their predicament is one
of substantial uncertainty. These defendants, faced with the

274 As noted in Part IA, this controversy also implicates the relationship between
federal supervised release terms and state pretrial detention. See note 63 and accompanying text.
275 See Probationand Parole in the United States, 2014*1 (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Nov 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T5JZ-WX2V (putting the supervised release population at an estimated 856,900).
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enormous pressures associated with pretrial detention and pending criminal charges, must also be concerned with whether they
remain under the power of their sentencing court. They deserve
the kind of certainty Congress attempted to create in adopting
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

